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/. Accused (by counsel only, if represented) may
address the Tribunal.
g. The prosecution may address the Tribunal.
h. The Tribunal will deliver judgment and pro-
nounce sentence.
SECTION V. JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE
Article 16. Penalty.—The Tribunal shall have
the power to impose upon an accused, on conviction,
death, or such other punishment as shall be deter-
mined by it to be just.
Article 17. Judgment and review.—The judgment
will be announced in open court and will give the
reasons on which it is based. The record of the trial
will be transmitted directly to the Supreme Com-
mander for the Allied Powers for his action. Sen-
tence will be carried out in accordance with the
Order of the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers, who may at any time reduce or otherwise
alter the sentence, except to increase its severity.
By command of General MacArthur:
Richard J. Marshall
Major General, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.
(26) In re Yamashita
(Supreme Court of the United States, 4 February 1946 (327 U. S. 1))
Mr. Chief Justice Stone delivered the opinion
of the Court.
No. 61 Miscellaneous is an application for leave to
file^a petition for writs of habeas corpus and prohibi-
tion in this Court. No. 672 is a petition for certiorari
to review an order of the Supreme Court of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines (28 U. S. C. § 349),
denying petitioner's application to that court for
writs of habeas corpus and prohibition. As both
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applications raise substantially like questions, and
because of the importance and novelty of some of
those presented, we set the two applications down
for oral argument as one case.
From the petitions and supporting papers it ap-
pears that prior to September 3, 1945, petitioner was
the Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army
Group of the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philip-
pine Islands. On that date he surrendered to and
became a prisoner of war of the United States Army
Forces in Baguio, Philippine Islands. On September
25th, by order of respondent, Lieutenant General
Wilhelm D. Styer, Commanding General of the
United States Army Forces, Western Pacific, which
command embraces the Philippine Islands, petitioner
was served with a charge prepared by the Judge
Advocate General's Department of the Army, pur-
porting to charge petitioner with a violation of the
law of war. On October 8, 1945, petitioner, after
pleading not guilty to the charge, was held for trial
before a military commission of five Army officers
appointed by order of General Styer. The order
appointed six Army officers, all lawyers, as defense
counsel. Throughout the proceedings which fol-
lowed, including those before this Court, defense
counsel have demonstrated their professional skill
and resourcefulness and their proper zeal for the
defense with which they were charged.
On the same date a bill of particulars was filed by
the prosecution, and the commission heard a motion
made in petitioner's behalf to dismiss the charge on
the ground that it failed to state a violation of the
law of war. On October 29th the commission was
reconvened, a supplemental bill of particulars was
filed, and the motion to dismiss was denied. The
trial then proceeded until its conclusion on December
7, 1945, the commission hearing two hundred and
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eighty-six witnesses, who gave over three thousand
pages of testimony. On that date petitioner was
found guilty of the offense as charged and sentenced
to death by hanging.
The petitions for habeas corpus set up that the
detention of petitioner for the purpose of the trial
was unlawful for reasons which are now urged as
showing that the military commission was without
lawful authority or jurisdiction to place petitioner on
trial, as follows:
{a) That the military commission which tried and
convicted petitioner was not lawfully created, and
that no military commission to try petitioner for
violations of the law of war could lawfully be con-
vened after the cessation of hostilities between the
armed forces of the United States and Japan;
(b) That the charge preferred against petitioner
fails to charge him with a violation of the law of war;
(c) That the commission was without authority
and jurisdiction to try and convict petitioner because
the order governing the procedure of the commission
permitted the admission in evidence of depositions,
affidavits and hearsay and opinion evidence, and be-
cause the commission's rulings admitting such evi-
dence were in violation of the 25th and 38th Articles
of War (10 U. S. C. §§ 1496, 1509) and the Geneva
Convention (47 Stat. 2021), and deprived petitioner
of a fair trial in violation of the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment;
(d) That the commission was without authority
and jurisdiction in the premises because of the failure
to give advance notice of petitioner's trial to the
neutral power representing the interests of Japan as
a belligerent as required by Article 60*of the Geneva
Convention, 47 Stat. 2021, 2051.
On the same grounds the petitions for writs of
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prohibition set up that the commission is without
authority to proceed with the trial.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, after
hearing argument, denied the petition for habeas
corpus presented to it, on the ground, among others,
that its jurisdiction was limited to an inquiry as to
the jurisdiction of the commission to place petitioner
on trial for the offense charged, and that the commis-
sion, being validly constituted by the order of General
Styer, had jurisdiction over the person of petitioner
and over the trial for the offense charged.
In Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, we had occasion to
consider at length the sources and nature of the
authority to create military commissions for the trial
of enemy combatants for offenses against the law of
war. We there pointed out that Congress, in the
exercise of the power conferred upon it by Article
I, § 8, CI. 10 of the Constitution to "define and
punish * * * Offences against the Law of Na-
tions * * *" of which the law of war is a part, had
by the Articles of War (10 U. S. C. §§ 1471-1593)
recognized the "military commission" appointed by
military command, as it had previously existed in
United States Army practice, as an appropriate
tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenses
against the law of war. Article IS declares that the
"provisions of these articles conferring jurisdiction
upon courts martial shall not be construed as de-
priving military commissions * * * or other mili-
tary tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of
offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war
may be triable by such military commissions * * *
or other military tribunals." See a similar provision
of the Espionage Act of 1917, SO U. S. C. § 38.
Article 2 includes among those persons subject to the
Articles of War the personnel of our own military
establishment. But this, as Article 12 indicates, does
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not exclude from the class of persons subject to trial
by military commissions "any other person who by
the law of war is subject to trial by military tri-
bunals," and who, under Article 12, may be tried by
court-martial, or under Article IS by military
commission.
We further pointed out that Congress, by sanction-
ing trial of enemy combatants for violations of the
law of war by military commissions, had not attempted
to codify the law of war or to mark its precise
boundaries. Instead, by Article IS it had incor-
porated, by reference, as within the preexisting
jurisdiction of military commissions created by
appropriate military command, all offenses which are
defined as such by the law of war, and which may
constitutionally be included within that jurisdiction.
It thus adopted the system of military common law
applied by military tribunals so far as it should be
recognized and deemed applicable by the courts, and
as further defined and supplemented by the Hague
Convention, to which the United States and the Axis
powers were parties.
We also emphasized in Ex parte Quirin, as we do
here, that on application for habeas corpus we are
not concerned with the guilt or innocence of the
petitioners. We consider here only the lawful power
of the commission to try the petitioner for the offense
charged. In the present cases it must be recognized
throughout that the military tribunals which Con-
gress has sanctioned by the Articles of War are not
courts whose rulings and judgments are made subject
to review by this Court. See Ex parte Vallandigham,
1 Wall. 243; In re Vidal, 179 U. S. 126; cf. Ex parte
Quirin, supra, 39. They are tribunals whose deter-
minations are reviewable by the military authorities
either as provided in the military orders consti-
tuting such tribunals or as provided by the Articles
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of War. Congress conferred on the courts no power
to review their determinations save only as it has
granted judicial power "to grant writs of habeas
corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause
of restraint of liberty." 28 U. S. C. §§ 451, 452.
The courts may inquire whether the detention com-
plained of is within the authority of those detaining
the petitioner. If the military tribunals have lawful
authority to hear, decide and condemn, their action
is not subject to judicial review merely because they
have made a wrong decision on disputed facts.
Correction of their errors of decision is not for the
courts but for the military authorities which are
alone authorized to review their decisions. See
Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 81; Runkle v. United
States, 122 U. S. 543, 555-556; Carter v. McClaughry,
183 U. S. 365; Collins v. McDonald, 258 U. S. 416.
Cf. Matter of Moran, 203 U. S. 96, 105.
Finally, we held in Ex parte Quirin, supra, 24, 25,
as we hold now, that Congress by sanctioning trials
of enemy aliens by military commission for offenses
against the law of war had recognized the right of the
accused to make a defense. Cf . Ex parte Kawato,
317 U. S. 69. It has not foreclosed their right to
contend that the Constitution or laws of the United
States withhold authority to proceed with the trial.
It has not withdrawn, and the Executive branch of
the Government could not, unless there was sus-
pension of the writ, withdraw from the courts the
duty and power to make such inquiry into the au-
thority of the commission as may be made by habeas
corpus.
With these governing principles in mind we turn
to the consideration of the several contentions urged
to establish want of authority in the commission.
We are not here concerned with the power of military
777534—48 22
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commissions to try civilians. See Ex parte Milligan,
4 Wall. 2, 132; Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378;
Ex parte Quirin, supra, 45. The Government's con-
tention is that General Styer's order creating the
commission conferred authority on it only to try the
purported charge of violation of the law of war com-
mitted by petitioner, an enemy belligerent, while in
command of a hostile army occupying United States
territory during time of war. Our first inquiry must
therefore be whether the present commission was
created by lawful military command and, if so,
whether authority could thus be conferred on the
commission to place petitioner on trial after the
cessation of hostilities between the armed forces of
the United States and Japan.
The authority to create the commission.—General
Styer's order for the appointment of the commission
was made by him as Commander of the United States
Army Forces, Western Pacific. His command in-
cludes, as part of a vastly greater area, the Philippine
Islands, where the alleged offenses were committed,
where petitioner surrendered as a prisoner of war,
and where, at the time of the order convening the
commission, he was detained as a prisoner in custody
of the United States Army. The congressional re-
cognition of military commissions and its sanction
of their use in trying offenses against the law of war
to which we have referred, sanctioned their creation
by military command in conformity to long-estab-
lished American precedents. Such a commission
may be appointed by any field commander, or by any
commander competent to appoint a general court-
martial, as was General Styer, who had been vested
with that power by order of the President. 2 Win-
throp, Military Law and Precedents, 2d ed., *1302;
cf. Article of War 8.
Here the commission was not only created by a
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commander competent to appoint it, but his order
conformed to the established policy of the Govern-
ment and to higher military commands authorizing
his action. In a proclamation of July 2, 1942 (56
Stat. 1964), the President proclaimed that enemy
belligerents who during time of war, enter the
United States, or any territory or possession thereof,
and who violate the law of war, should be subject to
the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military
tribunals. Paragraph 10 of the Declaration of Pots-
dam of July 26, 1945, declared that ". . . stern
justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, in-
cluding those who have visited cruelties upon our
prisoners." U. S. Dept. of State Bull., Vol. XIII,
No. 318, pp. 137-138. This Declaration was ac-
cepted by the Japanese government by its note of
August 10, 1945. U. S. Dept. of State Bull., Vol.
XIII, No. 320, p. 205.
By direction of the President, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff of the American Military Forces, on September
12, 1945, instructed General MacArthur, Commander
in Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, to
proceed with the trial, before appropriate military
tribunals, of such Japanese war criminals "as have
been or may be apprehended." By order of General
MacArthur of September 24, 1945, General Styer
was specifically directed to proceed with the trial of
petitioner upon the charge here involved. This
order was accompanied by detailed rules and regula-
tions which General MacArthur prescribed for the
trial of war criminals. These regulations directed,
among other things, that review of the sentence im-
posed by the commission should be by the officer
convening it, with "authority to approve, mitigate,
remit, commute, suspend, reduce or otherwise alter
the sentence imposed," and directed that no sentence
of death should be carried into effect until confirmed
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by the Commander in Chief, United States Army
Forces, Pacific.
It thus appears that the order creating the commis-
sion for the trial of petitioner was authorized by
military command, and was in complete conformity
to the Act of Congress sanctioning the creation of such
tribunals for the trial of offenses against the law of
war committed by enemy combatants. And we turn
to the question whether the authority to create the
commission and direct the trial by military order
continued after the cessation of hostilities.
An important incident to the conduct of war is the
adoption of measures by the military commander,
not only to repel and defeat the enemy, but to seize
and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies
who, in their attempt to thwart or impede our mili-
tary effort, have violated the law of war. Ex parte
Quirin, supra, 28. The trial and punishment of
enemy combatants who have committed violations
of the law of war is thus not only a part of the conduct
of war operating as a preventive measure against
such violations, but is an exercise of the authority
sanctioned by Congress to administer the system of
military justice recognized by the law of war. That
sanction is without qualification as to the exercise of
this authority so long as a state of war exists—from
its declaration until peace is proclaimed. See United
States v. Anderson, 9 Wall. 56, 70; The Protector,
12 Wall. 700, 702; McElrath v. United States, 102
U. S. 426, 438; Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U. S. 1, 9-10.
The war power, from which the commission derives
its existence, is not limited to victories in the field,
but carries with it the inherent power to guard against
the immediate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy,
at least in ways Congress has recognized, the evils
which the military operations have produced. See
Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 493, 507.
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We cannot say that there is no authority to con-
vene a commission after hostilities have ended to try
violations of the law of war committed before their
cessation, at least until peace has been officially
recognized by treaty or proclamation of the political
branch of the Government. In fact, in most in-
stances the practical administration of the system
of military justice under the law of war would fail
if such authority were thought to end with the cessa-
tion of hostilities. For only after their cessation
could the greater number of offenders and the princi-
pal ones be apprehended and subjected to trial.
No writer on international law appears to have
regarded the power of military tribunals, otherwise
competent to try violations of the law of war, as
terminating before the formal state of war has ended. 1
In our own military history there have been numerous
instances in which offenders were tried by military
commission after the cessation of hostilities and before
the proclamation of peace, for offenses against the
law of war committed before the cessation of hos-
tilities.2
The extent to which the power to prosecute viola-
tions of the law of war shall be exercised before peace
is declared rests, nor with the courts, but with the
1 The Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on
the Enforcement of Penalties of the Versailles Peace Conference, which met
after cessation of hostilities in the First World War, were of the view that vio-
lators of the law of war could be tried by military tribunals. See Report of the
Commission, March 9, 1919, 14 Am. J. Int. L. 95, 121. See also memorandum
of American commissioners concurring on this point, id., at p. 141. The treaties
of peace concluded after World War I recognized the right of the Allies and of
the United States to try such offenders before military tribunals. See Art.
228 of Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919; Art. 173 of Treaty of St. Germain,
Sept. 10, 1919; Art. 157 of Treaty of Trianon, June 4, 1920.
The terms of the agreement which ended hostilities in the Boer War reserved
the right to try, before military tribunals, enemy combatants who had violated
the law of war. 95 British and Foreign State Papers (1901-1902) 160. See
also trials cited in Colby, War Crimes, 23 Michigan Law Rev. 482, 496-7.
2 See cases mentioned in Ex parte Quirin, supra, p. 32, note 10, and in 2
Winthrop, supra, *1310-1311, n. 5; 14 Op. A. G. 249 (Modoc Indian Prisoners).
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political branch of the Government, and may itself
by governed by the terms of an armistice or the
treaty of peace. Here, peace has not been agreed
upon or proclaimed. Japan, by her acceptance of
the Potsdam declaration and her surrender, has
acquiesced in the trials of those guilty of violations
of the law of war. The conduct of the trial by the
military commission has been authorized by the
political branch of the Government, by military
command, by international law and usage, and by
the terms of the surrender of the Japanese govern-
ment.
The charge.—Neither congressional action nor the
military orders constituting the commission author-
ized it to place petitioner on trial unless the charge
preferred against him is of a violation of the law of
war. The charge, so far as now relevant, is that
petitioner, between October 9, 1944 and September
2, 1945, in the Philippine Islands, "while commander
of armed forces of Japan at war with the United
States of America and its allies, unlawfully disre-
garded and failed to discharge his duty as commander
to control the operations of the members of his
command, permitting them to commit brutal atroci-
ties and other high crimes against people of the
United States and of its allies and dependencies,
particularly the Philippines; and he * * * there-
by violated the laws of war."
Bills of particulars, filed by the prosecution by
order of the commission, allege a series of acts, one
hundred and twenty-three in number, committed by
members of the forces under petitioner's command
during the period mentioned. The first item specifies
the execution of "a deliberate plan and purpose to
massacre and exterminate a large part of the civilian
population of Batangas Province, and to devastate
and destroy public, private and religious property
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therein, as a result of which more than 25,000 men,
women and children, all unarmed noncombatant
civilians, were brutally mistreated and killed, with-
out cause or trial, and entire settlements were devas-
tated and destroyed wantonly and without military
necessity." Other items specify acts of violence,
cruelty and homicide inflicted upon the civilian pop-
ulation and prisoners of war, acts of wholesale pillage
and the wanton destruction of religious monuments.
It is not denied that such acts directed against the
civilian population of an occupied country and
against prisoners of war are recognized in interna-
tional law as violations of the law of war. Articles
4, 28, 46, and 47, Annex to the Fourth Hague Con-
vention, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2296, 2303, 2306-7.
But it is urged that the charge does not allege that
petitioner has either committed or directed the com-
mission of such acts, and consequently that no viola-
tion is charged as against him. But this overlooks
the fact that the gist of the charge is an unlawful
breach of duty by petitioner as an army commander
to control the operations of the members of his com-
mand by "permitting them to commit" the exten-
sive and widespread atrocities specified. The ques-
tion then is whether the law of war imposes on an
army commander a duty to take such appropriate
measures as are within his power to control the
troops under his command for the prevention of the
specified acts which are violations of the law of war
and which are likely to attend the occupation of
hostile territory by an uncontrolled soldiery, and
whether he may be charged with personal respon-
sibility for his failure to take such measures when
violations result. That this was the precise issue to
be tried was made clear by the statement of the pros-
ecution at the opening of the trial.
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It is evident that the conduct of military opera-
tions by troops whose excesses are unrestrained by
the orders or efforts of their commander would almost
certainly result in violations which it is the purpose
of the law of war to prevent. Its purpose to protect
civilian populations and prisoners of war from bru-
tality would largely be defeated if the commander
of an invading army could with impunity neglect to
take reasonable measures for their protection. Hence
the law of war presupposes that its violation is to be
avoided through the control of the operations of war
by commanders who are to some extent responsible
for their subordinates.
This is recognized by the Annex to the Fourth
Hague Convention of 1907, respecting the laws and
customs of war on land. Article 1 lays down as a
condition which an armed force must fulfill in order
to be accorded the rights of lawful belligerents, that
it must be "commanded by a person responsible for
his subordinates." 36 Stat. 2295. Similarly Article
19 of the Tenth Hague Convention, relating to bom-
bardment by naval vessels, provides that commanders
in chief of the belligerent vessels "must see that the
above Articles are properly carried out." 36 Stat.
2389. And Article 26 of the Geneva Red Cross Con-
vention of 1929, 47 Stat. 2074, 2092, for the ameliora-
tion of the condition of the wounded and sick in
armies in the field, makes it "the duty of the com-
manders-in-chief of the belligerent armies to provide
for the details of execution of the foregoing articles,
[of the convention] as well as for unforeseen cases
* * *" And, finally, Article 43 of the Annex of
the Fourth Hague Convention, 36 Stat. 2306, requires
that the commander of a force occupying enemy terri-
tory, as was petitioner, "shall take all the measures
in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible,
public order and safety, while respecting, unless
339
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country."
These provisions plainly imposed on petitioner,
who at the time specified was military governor of
the Philippines, as well as commander of the Japanese
forces, an affirmative duty to take such measures as
were within his power and appropriate in the cir-
cumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civil-
ian population. This duty of a commanding officer
has heretofore been recognized, and its breach penal-
ized by our own military tribunals. 3 A like principle
has been applied so as to impose liability on the
United States in international arbitrations. Case of
Jeannaud, 3 Moore, International Arbitrations, 3000;
Case of "The Zafiro", 5 Hackworth, Digest of Inter-
national Law, 707.
We do not make the laws of war but we respect
them so far as they do not conflict with the commands
of Congress or the Constitution. There is no con-
tention that the present charge, thus read, is without
the support of evidence, or that the commission held
petitioner responsible for failing to take measures
which were beyond his control or inappropriate for
a commanding officer to take in the circumstances.4
* Failure of an officer to take measures to prevent murder of an inhabitant of
an occupied country committed in his presence. Gen. Orders No. 221, Hq.
Div. of the Philippines, August 17, 1901. And in Gen. Orders No. 264, Hq.
Div. of the Philippines, September 9, 1901, it was held that an officer could not
be found guilty for failure to prevent a murder unless it appeared that the
accused had "the power to prevent" it.
4 In its findings the commission took account of the difficulties "faced by
the Accused with respect not only to the swift and overpowering advance of
American forces, but also to the errors of his predecessors, weaknesses in organ-
ization, equipment, supply . .
., training, communication, discipline and the
morale of his troops," and the "tactical situation, the character, training and
capacity of staff officers and subordinate commanders as well as the traits of
character ... of his troops." It nonetheless found that petitioner had not
taken such measures to control his troops as were "required by the circum-
stances." We do not weigh the evidence. We merely hold that the charge
sufficiently states a violation against the law of war, and that the commission,
upon the facts found, could properly find petitioner guilty of such a violation.
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We do not here appraise the evidence on which pe-
titioner was convicted. We do not consider what
measures, if any, petitioner took to prevent the com-
mission, by the troops under his command, of the
plain violations of the law of war detailed in the bill
of particulars, or whether such measures as he may
have taken were appropriate and sufficient to dis-
charge the duty imposed upon him. These are ques-
tions within the peculiar competence of the military
officers composing the commission and were for it to
decide. See Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. S. 167, 178.
It is plain that the charge on which petitioner was
tried charged him with a breach of his duty to control
the operations of the members of his command, by
permitting them to commit the specified atrocities.
This was enough to require the commission to hear
evidence tending to establish the culpable failure of
petitioner to perform the duty imposed on him by
the law of war and to pass upon its sufficiency to
establish guilt.
Obviously charges of violations of the law of war
triable before a military tribunal need not be stated
with the precision of a common law indictment.
Cf. Collins v. McDonald, supra, 420. But we con-
clude that the allegations of the charge, tested by
any reasonable standard, adequately allege a vio-
lation of the law of war and that the commission had
authority to try and decide the issue which it raised.
Cf. Dealy v. United States, 152 U. S. 539; Williamson
v. United States, 207 U. S. 425, 447; Glasser v.
United States, 315 U. S. 60, 66, and cases cited.
The proceedings before the commission.—The regu-
lations prescribed by General MacArthur governing
the procedure for the trial of petitioner by the com-
mission directed that the commission should admit
such evidence "as in its opinion would be of assistance
in proving or disproving the charge, or such as in the
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commission's opinion would have probative value in
the mind of a reasonable man," and that in particular
it might admit affidavits, depositions or other
statements taken by officers detailed for that purpose
by military authority. The petitions in this case
charged that in the course of the trial the commission
received, over objection by petitioner's counsel, the
deposition of a witness taken pursuant to military
authority by a United States Army captain. It
also, over like objection, admitted hearsay and
opinion evidence tendered by the prosecution. Pe-
titioner argues, as ground for the writ of habeas
corpus, that Article 25 5 of the Articles of War pro-
hibited the reception in evidence by the commission
of depositions on behalf of the prosecution in a
capital case, and that Article 38 6 prohibited the
reception of hearsay and of opinion evidence.
We think that neither Article 25 nor Article 38 is
applicable to the trial of an enemy combatant by a
military commission for violations of the law of war.
Article 2 of the Articles of War enumerates "the per-
sons * * * subject to these articles," who are
denominated, for purposes of the Articles, as "per-
sons subject to military law." In general, the
persons so enumerated are members of our own
Army and of the personnel accompanying the Army.
Enemy combatants are not included among them.
Articles 12, 13 and 14, before the adoption of Article
6 Article 25 provides: "A duly authenticated deposition taken upon reason-
able notice to the opposite party may be read in evidence before any military
court or commission in any case not capital, or in any proceeding before a
court of inquiry or a military board, . . . Provided, That testimony by deposition
may be adduced for the defense in capital cases."
•Article 38 provides: "The President may, by regulations, which he may
modify from time to time, prescribe the procedure, including modes of proof,
in cases before courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military commissions, and
other military tribunals, which regulations shall insofar as he shall deem practi-
cable, apply the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal
cases in the district courts of the United States: Provided, That nothing con-
trary to or inconsistent with these articles shall be so prescribed: . . ."
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15 in 1916, made all "persons subject to military
law" amenable to trial by courts-martial for any
offense made punishable by the Articles of War.
Article 12 makes triable by general court-martial
"any other person who by the law of war is subject
to trial by military tribunals." Since Article 2, in
its 1916 form, includes some persons who, by the law
of war, were, prior to 1916, triable by military com-
mission, it was feared by the proponents of the 1916
legislation that in the absence of a saving provision,
the authority given by Articles 12, 13 and 14 to try
such persons before courts-martial might be con-
strued to deprive the non-statutory military commis-
sion of a portion of what was considered to be its
traditional jurisdiction. To avoid this, and to
preserve that jurisdiction intact, Article IS was
added to the Articles. 7 It declared that "The pro-
visions of these articles conferring jurisdiction upon
courts-martial shall not be construed as depriving
military commissions * * * of concurrent juris-
diction in respect of offenders or offenses that
by the law of war may be triable by such
military commissions."
By thus recognizing military commissions in order
to preserve their traditional jurisdiction over enemy
combatants unimpaired by the Articles, Congress
gave sanction, as we held in Ex parte Quirin, to any
7 General Crowder, the Judge Advocate General, who appeared before
Congress as sponsor for the adoption of Article 15 and the accompanying
amendment of Article 25, in explaining the purpose of Article 15, said:
"Article 15 is new. We have included in article 2 as subject to military law
a number of persons who are also subject to trial by military commission. A
military commission is our common-law war court. It has no statutory exist-
ence, though it is recognized by statute law. As long as the articles embraced
them in the designation 'persons subject to military law,' and provided that
they might be tried by court-martial, I was afraid that, having made a special
provision for their trial by court-martial, [Arts. 12, 13 and 14] it might be held
that the provision operated to exclude trials by military commission and other
war courts; so this new article was introduced: . . ." (Sen. R. 130, 64th.
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 40.)
343
use of the military commission contemplated by the
common law of war. But it did not thereby make
subject to the Articles of War persons other than
those defined by Article 2 as being subject to the
Articles, nor did it confer the benefits of the Articles
upon such persons. The Articles recognized but
one kind of military commission, not two. But they
sanctioned the use of that one for the trial of two
classes of persons, to one of which the Articles do,
and to the other of which they do not, apply in such
trials. Being of this latter class, petitioner cannot
claim the benefits of the Articles, which are appli-
cable only to the members of the other class. Peti-
tioner, an enemy combatant, is therefore not a per-
son made subject to the Articles of War by Article 2,
and the military commission before which he was
tried, though sanctioned, and its jurisdiction saved,
by Article IS, was not convened by virtue of the
Articles of War, but pursuant to the common law of
war. It follows that the Articles of War, including
Articles 25 and 38, were not applicable to peti-
tioner's trial and imposed no restrictions upon the
procedure to be followed. The Articles left the
control over the procedure in such a case where it
had previously been, with the military command.
Petitioner further urges that by virtue of Article
63 of the Geneva Convention of 1929, 47 Stat. 2052,
he is entitled to the benefits afforded by the 25th
and 38th Articles of War to members of our own
forces. Article 63 provides: "Sentence may be
pronounced against a prisoner of war only by the
same courts and according to the same procedure as
in the case of persons belonging to the armed forces
of the detaining Power." Since petitioner is a pris-
oner of war, and as the 25th and 38th Articles of
War apply to the trial of any person in our own armed
forces, it is said that Article 63 requires them to be
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applied in the trial of petitioner. But we think
examination of Article 63 in its setting in the Con-
vention plainly shows that it refers to sentence "pro-
nounced against a prisoner of war" for an offense
committed while a prisoner of war, and not for a
violation of the law of war committed while a
combatant.
Article 63 of the Convention appears in part 3,
entitled "Judicial Suits," of Chapter 3, "Penalties
Applicable to Prisoners of War," of § V, "Prisoners'
Relations with the Authorities," one of the sections
of Title III, "Captivity." All taken together relate
only to the conduct and control of prisoners of war
while in captivity as such. Chapter 1 of § V, Article
42 deals with complaints of prisoners of war be-
cause of the conditions of captivity. Chapter 2,
Articles 43 and 44, relates to those of their number
chosen by prisoners of war to represent them.
Chapter 3 of § V, Articles 45 through 67, is en-
titled "Penalties Applicable to Prisoners of War."
Part 1 of that chapter, Articles 45 through 53, indi-
cate what acts of prisoners of war, committed while
prisoners, shall be considered offenses, and defines to
some extent the punishment which the detaining
power may impose on account of such offenses. 8
8 Part 1 of Chapter 3, "General Provisions," provides in Articles 45 and 46
that prisoners of war are subject to the regulations in force in the armies of
the detaining power, that punishments other than those provided "for the
same acts for soldiers of the national armies" may not be imposed on prisoners
of war, and that "Collective punishment for individual acts" is forbidden.
Article 47 provides that "Acts constituting an offense against discipline, and
particularly attempted escape, shall be verified immediately; for all prisoners
of war, commissioned or not, preventive arrest shall be reduced to the absolute
minimum. Judicial proceedings against prisoners of war shall be conducted
as rapidly as the circumstances permit * * * In all cases, the duration
of preventive imprisonment shall be deducted from the disciplinary or
judicial punishment inflicted * * *"
Article 48 provides that prisoners of war, after having suffered "the judicial
or disciplinary punishment which has been imposed on them" are not to be
treated differently from other prisoners, but provides that "prisoners punished
as a result of attempted escape may be subjected to special surveillance."
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Punishment is of two kinds—"disciplinary" and
"judicial/' the latter being the more severe. Article
52 requires that leniency be exercised in deciding
whether an offense requires disciplinary or judicial
punishment, Part 2 of Chapter 3 is entitled "Dis-
ciplinary Punishments," and further defines the
extent of such punishment, and the mode in which it
may be imposed. Part 3, entitled "Judicial Suits,"
in which Article 63 is found, describes the procedure
by which "judicial" punishment may be imposed.
The three parts of Chapter 3, taken together, are
thus a comprehensive description of the substantive
offenses which prisoners of war may commit during
their imprisonment, of the penalties which may be
imposed on account of such offenses, and of the
procedure by which guilt may be adjudged and
sentence pronounced.
We think it clear, from the context of these
recited provisions, that part 3, and Article 63 which
it contains, apply only to judicial proceedings directed
against a prisoner of war for offenses committed
while a prisoner of war. Section V gives no indica-
tion that this part was designed to deal with offenses
other than those referred to in parts 1 and 2 of
Chapter 3.
We cannot say that the commission, in admitting
evidence to which objection is now made, violated
any act of Congress, treaty or military command
Article 49 recites that prisoners "given disciplinary punishment may not be
deprived of the prerogatives attached to their rank." Articles 50 and 51 deal
with escaped prisoners who have been retaken or prisoners who have attempted
to escape. Article 52 provides: "Belligerents shall see that the competent
authorities exercise the greatest leniency in deciding the question of whether an
infraction committed by a prisoner of war should be punished by disciplinary
or judicial measures. This shall be the case especially when it is a question
of deciding on acts in connection with escape or attempted escape * * *
A prisoner may not be punished more than once because of the same act or
the same count."
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defining the commission's authority. For reasons
already stated we hold that the commission's rulings
on evidence and on the mode of conducting these
proceedings against petitioner are not reviewable by
the courts, but only by the reviewing military au-
thorities. From this viewpoint it is unnecessary to
consider what, in other situations, the Fifth Amend-
ment might require, and as to that no intimation
one way or the other is to be implied. Nothing we
have said is to be taken as indicating any opinion
on the question of the wisdom of considering such
evidence, or whether the action of a military tribunal
in admitting evidence, which Congress or controlling
military command has directed to be excluded, may
be drawn in question by petition for habeas corpus
or prohibition.
Effect of failure to give notice of the trial to the pro-
tecting power.—Article 60 of the Geneva Convention
of July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2051, to which the United
States and Japan were signatories, provides that "At
the opening of a judicial proceeding directed against
a prisoner of war, the detaining Power shall advise
the representative of the protecting Power thereof as
soon as possible, and always before the date set for
the opening of the trial." Petitioner relies on the
failure to give the prescribed notice to the protecting
power 9 to establish want of authority in the com-
mission to proceed with the trial.
For reasons already stated we conclude that Arti-
cle 60 of the Geneva Convention, which appears in
part 3, Chapter 3, § V, Title III of the Geneva Con-
vention, applies only to persons who are subjected
9 Switzerland, at the time of the trial, was the power designated by Japan
for the protection of Japanese prisoners of war detained by the United States
,
except in Hawaii. U. S. Dept. of State Bull., Vol. XIII, No. 317, p. 125.
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to judicial proceedings for offenses committed while
prisoners of war. 10
10 One of the items of the bill of particulars, in support of the charge against
petitioner, specifies that he permitted members of the armed forces under his
command to try and execute three named and other prisoners of war, "subject-
ing to trial without prior notice to a representative of the protecting power,
without opportunity to defend, and without counsel; denying opportunity to
appeal from the sentence rendered; failing to notify the protecting power of
the sentence pronounced; and executing a death sentence without communi-
cating to the representative of the protecting power the nature and circum-
stances of the offense charged." It might be suggested that if Article 60 is
inapplicable to petitioner it is inapplicable in the cases specified, and that hence
he could not be lawfully held or convicted on a charge of failing to require the
notice, provided for in Article 60, to be given.
As the Government insists, it does not appear from the charge and specifica-
tions that the prisoners in question were not charged with offenses committed
by them as prisoners rather than with offenses against the law of war com-
mitted by them as enemy combatants. But apart from this consideration,
independently of the notice requirements of the Geneva Convention, it is a
violation of the law of war, on which there could be a conviction if supported
by evidence, to inflict capital punishment on prisoners of war without affording
to them opportunity to make a defense. 2 Winthrop, supra, *434—435, 1241;
Article 84, Oxford Manual, Laws and Customs of War on Land; U. S. War
Dept., Basic Field Manual, Rules of Land Warfare (1940) par. 356; Lieber's
Code, G. O. No. 100 (1863) Instructions for the Government of Armies of the
United States in the Field, par. 12; Spaight, War Rights on Land, 462, n.
Further, the commission, in making its findings, summarized as follows the
charges, on which it acted, in three classes, any one of which, independently of
the others if supported by evidence, would be sufficient to support the convic-
tion: (1) execution or massacre without trial and maladministration generally
of civilian internees and prisoners of war; (2) brutalities committed upon the
civilian population, and (3) burning and demolition, without adequate military
necessity, of a large number of homes, places of business, places of religious
worship, hospitals, public buildings and educational institutions.
The commission concluded: "(1) That a series of atrocities and other high
crimes have been committed by members of the Japanese armed forces" under
command of petitioner "against people of the United States, their allies and
dependencies * * *; that they were not sporadic in nature but in many
cases were methodically supervised by Japanese officers and noncommissioned
officers"; (2) that during the period in question petitioner "failed to provide
effective control of * * * [his] troops, as was required by the circumstances."
The commission said: "* * * where murder and rape and vicious, revenge-
ful actions are widespread offenses, and there is no effective attempt by a com-
mander to discover and control the criminal acts, such a commander may be
held responsible, even criminally liable, for the lawless acts of his troops, de-
pending upon their nature and the circumstances surrounding them."
The commission made no finding of non-compliance with the Geneva Con-
vention. Nothing has been brought to our attention from which we could
777534—48 23
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It thus appears that the order convening the com-
mission was a lawful order, that the commission was
lawfully constituted, that petitioner was charged
with violation of the law of war, and that the com-
mission had authority to proceed with the trial, and
in doing so did not violate any military, statutory,
or constitutional command. We have considered,
but find it unnecessary to discuss, other contentions
which we find to be without merit. We therefore
conclude that the detention of petitioner for trial and
his detention upon his conviction, subject to the
prescribed review by the military authorities, were
lawful, and that the petition for certiorari, and leave
to file in this Court petitions for writs of habeas
corpus and prohibition should be, and they are
Denied.
Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the con-
sideration or decision of these cases.
[Dissenting opinions by Mr. Justice Murphy and
Mr. Justice Rutledge are not reproduced.]
conclude that the alleged non-compliance with Article 60 of the Geneva Con-
vention had any relation to the commission's finding of a series of atrocities
committed by members of the forces under petitioner's command, and that he
failed to provide effective control of his troops, as was required by the circum-
stances; or which could support the petitions for habeas corpus on the ground
that petitioner had been charged with or convicted for failure to require the
notice prescribed by Article 60 to be given.
